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EROSION AND TAKINGS CLAIMS:
FOR WHOM THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TOLLS
Dawn Gallagher*
I. INTRODUCTION
While it is well known that the U.S. Constitution prohibits the
government from taking private property for public use without fair
compensation, few realize that potential claimants have six years from the
date the taking accrues to file a claim for damages. A six-year time limit,
even strictly applied, may seem sufficiently lenient on its face. However,
in 1994 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently ruled,
in interpreting this time limit, that plaintiffs who suffered severe erosion
damage from a government channeling and port project constructed in the
early 1950s were not barred from filing suit in 1992-over forty years after
the erosion began. In Applegate v. United States,' the court concluded
that the date the governmental act became a permanent taking, or when
the taking "accrued," was not the date the government "invaded" the
plaintiffs' property, or the date the plaintiffs first noticed property
damage.2 Instead, the court used the date on which the government last
pledged to repair the damage to determine whether the plaintiffs met the
six-year statute of limitations. Because the government initiated plans to
restore the damage as late as 1988, the court found that the statute of
limitations had not run in 1992, the year the plaintiffs filed their claim.'
The Applegate decision, therefore, permits courts to use one governmental
act to determine whether the procedural time limit is met, and another to
determine the substantive legal issue of whether a taking occurred. In
light of the fact that courts must first consider the procedural time limit
issue before reaching the merits of a particular claim, the Applegate
* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 1997.
1. 25 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
2. Id. at 1584.
3. Id.
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decision will provide more opportunities to sue the government for a
taking.
Although it may appear that the Applegate court stretched the six-year
statute of limitations beyond its limits, this Note will demonstrate that the
court's decision conforms with takings case law and upholds the principles
of fairness that underlie statutes of limitations. This Note will also
demonstrate that if the court had ruled that the statute of limitations barred
the plaintiffs' claim, it would effectively relieve the federal government
of its responsibility to repair government-caused damage or to compensate
owners for taking their property, not only for the Applegate plaintiffs, but
also for most other takings victims as well. Part II of this Note describes
the procedure a property owner must follow to sue the government for
taking her property, and the additional burdens coastal property owners
face when they claim a government act caused flooding or erosion
damage. Part III summarizes the Applegate decision. Part IV discusses
the conflict between procedural time limits and the long periods that may
elapse from the time of the governmental act to the time the act damages
the property. Part V also describes methods courts have developed to
ensure that time limits do not unjustly prevent a plaintiff from pursuing
her claim in court. Part VI concludes that by requiring the government
to consider the long-term impact of its acts on private property, the
Applegate decision will help to preserve notions of individual justice and
responsibility on the part of the government.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Takings
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires the federal
government to compensate owners for permanently taking their property
for public use.4 The government may "take" private property by physi-
cally invading or regulating property to the point where the government
essentially appropriates it.5 When the government physically invades
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The amendment was not intended to preclude the
government from taking private property for public purposes, but to insure property
owners are compensated in such events. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987). See U.S. v. Reynolds, Ky., 397 U.S.
14 (1961) for a description of how courts calculate just compensation.
5. See generally Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922).
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property, it may claim the property and compensate the owner before
entering. Alternatively, it may refrain from claiming the property
beforehand, in which case, the owner must wait until the invasion is
permanent and then file a claim for damages.6
When the federal government chooses not to claim the property
before entering, the Federal Tucker Act7 provides the procedural frame-
work for property owners to sue the federal government for damages.
While most statutes are tailored to specific types of claims, the Tucker Act
is a broad enabling statute governing all claims against the United States
founded on "the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation
of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with
the United States."' Consequently, the Tucker Act also covers cases
involving contracts, tax refunds, Indian treaties, and specific referrals
from Congress.9
Among other restrictions, the Tucker Act denies a plaintiff the option
of a jury trial10 and the right to file his suit in state court.1" More impor-
tantly, the Tucker Act does not allow a claimant to ask the court to
prevent the government from destroying property. For example, the court
is: (1) barred from issuing an injunction that stops the government from
damaging property when the landowner can later sue for damages; 12 (2)
6. United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 21 (1958).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1994).
9. See James E. Ellsworth, Suing the Sovereign, UTAH B.J., Dec. 1990, at 8, 8,
which describes the seven types of claims covered by the Tucker Act: (1) express or
implied contracts; (2) tax refund claims; (3) fifth amendment takings claims; (4) civilian
and military pay claims; (5) patent and copyright claims; (6) Indian claims; and (7)
congressionally referred claims.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1994) prohibits jury trials for Tucker Act claims. See Charter
Fed. Savings Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 976 F.2d 203 (4th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 1643 (1993), where the Supreme Court upheld the jury trial prohibition
for Tucker Act claims filed in a federal district court.
11. The Federal Claims Court has original jurisdiction for suits filed under the
Tucker Act and exclusive jurisdiction for claims exceeding $10,000. 28 U.S.C. §
1491(a)(2) (1994). Federal district courts have concurrent jurisdiction for suits not
exceeding $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a)(2) (1994). Thus, a claimant is precluded
altogether from filing a Tucker Act suit in a state court.
12. See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963) (takings claim against the federal
government may only be brought under the Tucker Act and injunctive relief is not proper);
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984) ("[E]quitable relief is not
available to enjoin an alleged taking of private property for a public use, duly authorized
1997]
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generally prohibited from ordering the government to keep a promise or
a contract to repair damage;13 and (3) precluded from awarding damages
that are "temporary" in nature.1 4
The Tucker Act gives the Federal Claims Court original, and in most
cases, exclusive jurisdiction to decide the types of claims described
above.' 5 Furthermore, the rules governing the Federal Claims Court
present another significant procedural hurdle for takings claims, particu-
larly claims based on long-term flooding and erosion damage, in the form
of its statute of limitations. If a plaintiff does not file a petition within six
years after the claim accrues, the plaintiff loses her legal right to sue the
government for damages. 6 Thus, if a claimant files her petition more
than six years after the governmental act, it is likely that the government
will claim that the time limit for filing a claim has passed. The plaintiff
then bears the burden of proving that the statute of limitations has not run,
or the court will dismiss her suit before it reaches the substance of the
by law, when a suit for compensation can be brought against the sovereign subsequent to
the taking."); Werner v. U.S. Department of Interior, Fish & Wildlife Services, Bureau
of Sport Fisheries & Wildlife, 581 F.2d 168 (8th Cir. 1978) (where damages are only
incidental to a claim seeking injunctive relief, the district court has no jurisdiction under
the Tucker Act to grant the equitable relief sought).
13. To require the government to perform under a contract, the court would need to
order "specific performance," a form of equitable relief. Because the Tucker Act only
allows monetary damages, a plaintiff must wait until the government breaches the contract
and then sue afterward for damages. Additionally, damages for breaching implied
contracts, that is, unwritten informal agreements, are only available for situations where
the government has a motive to contract, intends to be bound, and where there is "offer
and acceptance" by both parties. Alliance of Descendants of Texas Land Grants v. United
States, 37 F.3d 1478, 1483 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
14. While the Supreme Court has ruled that a government intrusion, no matter how
minute, may be a "physical invasion," a minute intrusion must be permanent to constitute
a taking. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). If the
government act merely amounts to a temporary trespass, the claimant may recover damages
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, incorporated in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1994). If
the government imposes a regulation that is later found to be a taking, the government must
compensate the landowner for the time in which the regulation was in force. First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, Cal., 482 U.S. 304
(1987). However, property owners cannot sue for a temporary regulatory taking until the
regulation has been withdrawn. Id. at 321. Additionally, an erosion claim, unlike
government intrusions and regulations that may be withdrawn or flooding that may recede,
involves damage that is permanent by its very nature.
15. See supra note 11.
16. Actions under the Tucker Act "shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed
within six years after such claim first accrues." 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (1994).
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claim. 17 Because of the importance of this threshold question, courts have
spent considerable time interpreting the word "accrues," especially in the
context of claims involving gradual flooding or erosion damage.
In 1947, in United States v. Dickinson,"8 the Supreme Court ruled for
the first time that the Tucker Act's statute of limitations does not automati-
cally bar a claim for flood damage that is filed more than six years after
a governmental act. In Dickinson, a government dam caused the water
level of a river to rise until it permanently flooded the claimant's land.
The landowner sued eight years after the dam began to impound water,
but less than six years after the water reached its ultimate or stabilized
level. Categorizing the flooding as a "continuous and gradual" process,
the Court ruled the claimant acted appropriately by "postponing the suit
until the situation stabilized" when he could make a "final account" of the
damage to the property.19
Although the Dickinson decision provides some flexibility about the
timing of damage claims, the Claims Court has not interpreted Dickinson
to mean that the statute of limitations begins to accrue when there is no
possibility of further damage.0 The court has concluded that "certainty,
definiteness, or foreseeability of flooding or erosion... defines the taking
and triggers the limitations period."2 In Cooper v. United States,2 the
court defined "certainty" as the point at which the extent of the destruc-
tion is ascertainable. Cooper had filed a claim more than six years after
17. Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendant has
the burden of asserting that the statute of limitations bars the claim. However, if the
plaintiff filed the claim in question more than six years after the initial governmental act,
the government faces almost no difficulty in claiming the time limit has passed. The
burden then shifts to the plaintiff who must provide sufficient evidence so that the court is
willing to continue hearing the case. Thus, the plaintiff effectively bears the burden of
proving her case before the court even reaches the substantive issues of the takings claim.
See 5A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1394, at 778 (2d ed. 1990).
18. 331 U.S. 745 (1947).
19. Id. at 749.
20. See, e.g., Columbia Basin Orchard v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 738, 739 (Ct.
Cl. 1950), where the court dismissed a takings claim filed more than six years after the
government purified a contaminated well that had destroyed the plaintiff's trees. The court
stated, "we do not think the Supreme Court, in the Dickinson case, meant to hold that
plaintiff was entitled to wait until any possibility of further damage had been removed."
Id. at 739.
21. Applegate v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 554, 561 (1993), rev'd and remanded,
25 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
22. 827 F.2d 762, 764 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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a government waterway flooded his property, and five years after he had
first noticed the flooding had damaged his orchard. The Cooper court
concluded that the plaintiff was not aware of the extent of the damage
until the trees died, which was the same year he filed suit.' In Barnes v.
United States,24 the court ruled that intermittent flooding amounted to a
taking four years after the first flood when "it first became clearly
apparent... that the intermittent flooding was of a permanent [(definite)]
nature. "25 Finally, in Nadler Foundry & Machine Co. v. United States,'
the court found that the situation had "stabilized" the same year that a
one-time dredging operation caused the first extensive cave-in of the
plaintiff's riverfront property. Although the claimant argued that the
situation had not stabilized until many years later, after a second cave-in
totally destroyed the property, the court disagreed, stating that the ultimate
destruction of the land was a "foreseeable future event" after the first
cave-in. 27
Even when a waterfront property owner proves that she has filed a
timely claim, the first substantive legal challenge she may face in court is
to demonstrate that the damaged property is not subject to a dominant
government easement. This easement, called the navigation servitude,'
23. Applying Dickinson's stabilization doctrine, the court reasoned that the critical
question was "when did the destruction of trees become sufficiently stabilized so that the
owner could determine the amount of timber taken?" Id.
24. 538 F.2d 865 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
25. Id. at 873. In Barnes, the government released dammed waters to control the
flow of the Missouri River and to eliminate sediment that had been deposited from earlier
damming actions. Although government engineering studies showed that the dam would
flood and deposit sediments on nearby farm lands, the government continued its operations.
The plaintiff farmers filed suit, claiming that the government actions caused periodic and
intermittent flooding that eventually destroyed their crops. After concluding that
"[a]dopting a date of taking must often be done in a somewhat imprecise manner," the
court ruled that "the date the Government completed taking its flowage easement cannot
be prior to when, through passage of time, the permanent character of intermittent flooding
could fairly be perceived." Id. Thus, the court decided that the taking was "definite"
when the final flood occurred, a date four years after the government first flooded the
property.
26. 164 F. Supp. 249, 251 (Ct. CI. 1958). In finding that "the plaintiff would carry
the Dickinson doctrine too far[,]" the court dismissed a claim for damages that was filed
more than twenty years after the one-time dredging operation caused an extensive cave-in,
but less than six years after a second cave-in totally destroyed the property. Id. at 251.
27. Id.
28. The federal navigation servitude is based on the principle that the federal
government's power to regulate navigable waters is not only superior to state common law
420
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exempts the government from compensating landowners for taking their
property when the government acts to improve navigation. In general, the
easement extends to the high water mark of navigable waterways.29 In
cases involving flood damage, if the governmental act raises the level of
water above the high water mark, the government must compensate the
owner for any damage.30 However, most erosion damage results from
governmental acts which interfere with normal water velocities or currents
but that do not raise the level of the water above the high water mark.
For this reason, courts have historically ruled that erosion damage was
incidental, and noncompensable, under the government's authority to
improve navigation."
One of the decisions finding that the navigation servitude barred a
claim for erosion damages was Pitman v. United States,32 a 1972 erosion
claim that arose from the same Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) project
inApplegate. Following the traditional reasoning, the Pitman court found
no evidence that the Corps physically invaded the plaintiff's property
during construction of the project or that the project raised the level of the
water above the high water mark. The court reasoned that the plaintiff was
actually claiming compensation for land that now lay under navigable
waters-land subject to the navigation servitude.33
In 1988, however, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
overruled Pitman and the earlier decisions by finding that, as with
property rights, but also "superior" to the Constitutional requirement that the government
must compensate a property owner when it confiscates his property for public use. Federal
Power Commission v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239, 249-50 (1954).
29. Id. at 249.
30. See, e.g., Coates v. United States, 117 Ct. Cl. 795 (1950) (government act to
improve navigation by raising the level of the Missouri River above the high water mark
required compensation); United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 509
(1945) ("[-igh-water mark bounds the bed of the river. Lands above it are fast lands and
to flood them is a taking for which compensation must be paid.").
31. See, e.g., Franklin v. United States, 101 F.2d 459 (6th Cir.), 4'd, 308 U.S.
516 (1939) (interruption of the southerly littoral flow of sand by an Army Corps of
Engineers' project constructing jetties at the entrance of a harbor was not a direct invasion
or appropriation of the plaintiff's property; any damage above the high water mark was
noncompensable damage incidental to the government's right to improve navigation).
32. 457 F.2d 975 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
33. The Pitman court held that the interruption of the southerly littoral flow of sand
which nourished the plaintiffs' beach was "consequential damage for which no recovery
may be had[,]" even assuming that erosion was reasonably foreseeable, where there was
no evidence that entry was made on land by the Corps of Engineers in the course of
construction or maintenance of the project. Id. at 977.
1997]
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flooding claims, the government must compensate landowners for erosion
damage above the high water mark. In Owen v. United States,3 4 an
upriver dredging project increased the water velocity of a river, which
eventually caused the plaintiff's house to topple into the water. Finding
that there must be a limit to the navigation servitude or it "would extend
infinitely in all directions and swallow up any claim for just compensa-
tion," the court concluded that claims for erosion damage above the high
water mark cannot be dismissed as falling under the navigation
servitude. 35 Having established that an upstream government act could
amount to a compensable taking for downstream erosion, the stage was set
for Applegate.
B. Statutes of Limitations
To appreciate the impact that statutes of limitations can have on
takings claims, it is important to first explore the evidentiary burden upon
a plaintiff attempting to prove that the government "took" property.
For a successful erosion takings claim, a plaintiff must prove that an
otherwise legitimate governmental act caused permanent and significant
damage to property that is free from public encumbrances.36 Stated
another way, the damage cannot result from a negligent or illegal govern-
34. 851 F.2d 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
35. Id. at 1410. The Federal Court of Appeals indicated that while the lower court
could find that sand which had been below the high water mark before the government act
was subject to the navigation servitude, the lower court had "improperly extended that
same logic to prevent compensation for erosion loss of land located above the ocean's high-
water mark." Id. at 1413.
36. In Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146 (1924), the Supreme Court rejected
the plaintiff's claim for flooding damage caused by a government levee that unintentionally
acted as a dam. The Court concluded that the government act must "constitute an actual,
permanent invasion of the land, amounting to an appropriation of and not merely an injury
to the property." Id. at 149. See also United States v. Cress 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917)
(intermittent flooding must produce "substantial" damage).
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ment act 37 must not be temporary3 or insignificant, 39 and the property
must not be subject to the federal navigation servitude."
The requirement that the governmental act "cause permanent and
significant damage," plays an important part in a takings claim. The
Supreme Court has interpreted "cause" to mean that the damage would
not have occurred "but for" the governmental act.41 This burden is
37. In fact, the Tucker Act only allows claims "not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. §
1491(a)(1) (1994). Federal courts have interpreted this provision to mean "a taking occurs,
and compensation as allowed by the Fifth Amendment must be paid, when there has been
a legal action by the government. Illegal government actions do not result in takings."
Catellus Development Corp. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 399, 408 n.9 (1994) (dismissing
a takings claim for property that was contaminated with Army dud ordinances illegally
placed on the land).
38. See supra text accompanying note 14. See also Barnes v. United States, 538
F.2d at 873, where the court ruled that a taking occurs only when damage becomes
"permanent."
39. The Court of Claims interpreted the term "insignificant" in National By-
Products, Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1256, 1275 (Ct. Cl. 1969) by finding, "lilt is a
long settled principle that a taking is not affected by the extent of the benefit to the
Government, but solely by the amount of injury to the landowner. . . . [Even] the
Government's foreknowledge [of the consequences of its act] will not convert an otherwise
insufficient injury into a taking." (emphasis added). Id. at 1275.
40. See supra note 28. The navigation servitude presents barriers for erosion claims
not found in flooding cases. First, because the government act never raises the water level
above the high water mark, it is more difficult for the landowner to prove that the
government act, and not an act of nature, caused the erosion. Second, even if the
government act destroys property above the high water mark, under some circumstances,
the government may still be exempt from paying compensation. The Supreme Court has
ruled that upland property destroyed by a project designed to preserve navigable water in
a channel, or to restore the natural flow of a river, falls under the navigation servitude.
Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217, 225 (1904) (rejecting takings claim by Mississippi
River landowners because the government revetments that caused the erosion were built
to preserve navigability of the river). One court has also ruled that a noncompensable
taking occurs where property is destroyed as a result of dam construction during a natural
disaster. Dudley v. Orange County, 137 So. 2d 859, 863 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962) (govern-
ment not required to compensate where dams constructed during a natural disaster
increased the degree of flooding). Thus, if the Applegate plaintiffs argued that the taking
occurred solely from the additional dredging and jetty work, they would need to prove that
the additional work did not result from an effort to preserve navigable water, or as a result
of an emergency. Otherwise, the destruction of property would be a noncompensable
taking.
41. In Owen v. United States, 20 Cl. Ct. 574 (1990), the Claims Court ruled, on
remand from the United States Court of Appeals, that a property owner failed to establish
that dredging activities caused her home to collapse in a river. The Claims Court found
the "issue is whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that, but for the dredging . . . the
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particularly cumbersome for coastal landowners whose property is subject
to seasonal flooding or currents that alter the shoreline by carrying and
depositing sand.42 In fact, courts have historically denied takings claims
in situations where pre-project flooding or natural erosion occurs, finding
that additional damage from the government act is inconsequential and
incidental to the damage caused by nature.43 To be "permanent and
significant," the act may be "inevitably recurring"' and does not have to
last forever, but it must cause damage that "rises above a temporary,
incidental injury-in the nature of a tort."45
In practical terms, to succeed with a takings claim, a plaintiff must:
(1) determine and demonstrate the historical effects of natural flooding and
longshore currents on her property; (2) prove the government act caused
damage that would not have occurred "but for" the act; and (3) establish
that the government-caused erosion severely and permanently damaged
her property. By their very nature, gradual and continuous erosion claims
require knowing the long-term effects of a government project in order to
prove the "but for" and "permanency" elements of a taking. Thus, any
strictly applied time limit on the filing of a claim may interfere with, or
possibly deny, a plaintiff's opportunity to prove her claim.
Statutes of limitations are merely legislatively established time limits
for bringing particular actions.' Because each state has the authority to
property would have been undamaged." (emphasis added) Id. at 584.
42. See, e.g., Laughlin v. United States, 22 CI. Ct. 85 (1990), where the court
denied a takings claim when a flood control project increased the groundwater level of a
marsh, on the grounds that the land had always been subject to the risk of successive
periodic overflows from floodwater.
43. Id. at 102. "To attach liability to the [government] .. .every time ...
groundwater invaded the root zone ... would make a government agency responsible for
whatever climatic conditions nature chooses to deliver." Id. See also Miller v. United
States, 583 F.2d 857, 864 (6th Cir. 1978), dism'd on remand, 480 F. Supp. 612 (E.D.
Mich. 1979) (noting that even if a government structure increased or prolonged flooding,
the plaintiffs could not show "direct appropriation" of the land because natural factors had
historically caused fluctuations in the levels of the lake).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917) (government act may
constitute a taking when flooding is subject to "intermittent, but inevitably recurring"
inundation of water caused by government act); Fromme v. United States, 412 F.2d 1192,
1196-97 (CI. Ct. 1969) (permanent, intermittent flooding which amounts to a taking must
be frequent).
45. National By-Products v. United States, 405 F.2d at 1275.
46. See Katharine F. Nelson, The 1990 Federal "Fallback" Statute of Limitations:
Limitations by Default, 72 NEB. L. REv. 454 (1993), for a discussion of the history and
nature of federal statute of limitations, and the problems associated with federal courts
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establish its own statutes of limitations, time limits vary not only from
state to state, but also based on the type of action.47 Additionally, state
statutes of limitations frequently differ from the federal time limits for
similar types of action. 48 Although the Supreme Court has described
statutes of limitations as "arbitrary by definition," 49 they are supposed to
reflect a underlying principle of fairness by balancing: the interests of a
plaintiff to be heard and fully litigate a claim; a defendant's need for
finality and peace of mind; and efficiency interests of the judicial system.50
This subjective balancing act results in time limits that reflect a legisla-
ture's "value judgment" concerning the point at which "the interests in
favor of protecting valid claims are outweighed by the interests in
prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones. "5 Statutes of limitations breed
borrowing state established time limits.
47. InM'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312 (1839), the Supreme Court ruled
that a statute of limitations is a procedural law, and the forum hearing a particular case may
apply its own time limits even when the substantive law governing the case is from another
jurisdiction with a different statute of limitations. See also Sam Walker, Forum Shopping
for Stale Claims: Statutes of Limitations and Conflict of Laws, 23 AKRON L. REv. 19
(1989), which describes the disparity of time limits among states and types of claims. For
example, New Hampshire has a general statute of limitations that requires claims to be
filed within three years of the act, while Mississippi has a six year time limit. Id. at 28-33.
Even within the federal legal system, time limits vary depending on the type of claim. For
example, U.S. veterans have twelve\years to apply for vocational rehabilitation benefits,
yet only one year to apply for disability compensation. See Federal Statutes of Limitations,
20 SW. U. L. REv. 495, 944-47 (1991) (listing statutes of limitations for federal statutory
causes of action and other procedural time limits).
48. For example, New Hampshire has a three year time limit for filing tort claims.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:4 (1988 & Supp. 1990). The Federal Tort Claims Act has
a two year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1994).
49. In Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945), the Supreme Court
maintained that "[s]tatutes of limitations find their justification in necessity and conve-
nience rather than in logic. They represent expedients, rather than principles.... They
are by definition arbitrary." Id. at 314.
50. Statutes of limitations preclude the prosecution of stale claims where "evidence
has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared." R.R. Tel. v.
Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944). See also James M. Fischer, The
Limits of Statutes of Limitations, 16 Sw. U.L. REv. 1 (1986), which discusses the factors
that society uses to set time limits, including: (1) preventing the perpetrations of fraud by
stale claims; (2) enhancing commercial transactions by freeing individuals from the
distraction of litigation; and (3) discouraging courts from reaching difficult decisions based
on stale evidence.
51. Sun Oil v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 736 (1988). In Sun Oil, Justice Brennan
described the balance of interests as follows:
The statute of limitations a State enacts represents a balance between, on one
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inevitable conflicts between fixed time limits, which bar claims based on
presumed prejudice rather than actual prejudice, and the duty of the court
to provide individualized justice. Legislatures and courts have recognized
that generic statutory time limits may not provide just and fair results in
all cases. Congress has excepted minors, insane individuals, and those
out to sea at the expiration of the six-year time limit from the Tucker
Act.52 The courts have exempted certain types of racial discrimination
claims and Indian treaty disputes from statutes of limitations altogether. 3
Courts have ruled that a statute of limitations must be reasonable and
have a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.54 The
Supreme Court has invalidated short and strict time limits on the grounds
that they violate due process and equal protection rights.55 Additionally,
courts have used a "continuing claims" theory to extend the statute of
limitations by finding that a new claim accrues for subsequent government
hand, its substantive interest in vindicating substantive claims, and on the other
hand, a combination of its procedural interest in freeing its courts from
adjudicating stale claims and its substantive interest in giving individuals repose
from ancient breaches of law.
Id.
52. Under federal statute, "persons under legal disability or beyond the seas at the
time the claim accrues may file a claim within three years after the disability ceases." 28
U.S.C. § 2501.
53. In Occidental Life Insurance Company v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977), the
Supreme Court held that no time limit applies to actions brought by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) for enforcement actions under the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
The Court reasoned that because EEOC regulations require plaintiffs to pursue internal
remedies at the workplace, the employer knows he is being accused. Furthermore, placing
a time limit on enforcement claims would put undue pressure on EEOC's administrative
officers. In County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985), the Court
allowed the Oneida Indian Nation to use the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1793 to
overcome the government's argument that the statute of limitations barred the plaintiffs
from claiming that New York State owed them rent for Indian lands. See also Patrick M.
McDowell, Limitation Periods for Federal Causes of Action After the Judicial Improvement
Act of 1990, 44 VAND. L. REv. 1355 (1991), for a discussion of various types of federal
claims and the respective statutes of limitations governing them.
54. Clark v. Singer, 298 S.E.2d 484, 485-486 (Ga. 1983).
55. In Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982), the Supreme Court ruled that a Texas
statute which imposed a strict, one-year period for bringing paternity actions was
unconstitutional, in part, because the short time limit was not substantially related to the
state's interest of avoiding stale claims. The Court later applied the Mills principles in
Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983), to rule that Tennessee's more flexible two-year time
limit was also unconstitutional.
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acts, even if the original act occurred more than six years ago; and courts
have also ruled that a new claim accrues when the government restores a
property owner's expectation that he will be able to use or develop his
property.56 For example, in Creppel v. United States, I the Court of
Appeals accepted the plaintiff's takings claim, filed more than six years
after an Environmental Protection Agency order halted the plaintiff's land
reclamation project, because a subsequent-although later overturned-
district court order allowed the project to continue. The court reasoned
that the court order "restored some potential expectation of completion of
the Project and thus some measure of the property's value.""8 Further-
more, at least one court has allowed a takings claim that was filed after
the statutory time limit, on the ground that the longer time limit allowed
by an adverse possession statute applied to the claim.59
In addition to extending the six-year time limit, the courts have
suspended statutes of limitations under the doctrine of "equitable tolling"
when a plaintiff could not reasonably determine that an injury exists, or
when a defendant withholds facts or deceives a plaintiff into not filing suit
until after the statute of limitations runs.' In a case decided after the
56. The courts generally apply the "continuing claims" theory in employment and
contract disputes when there are no disputed facts and the court may resolve the case by
interpreting the law and regulations as they existed at the time of the original act. Roberts
v. United States, 151 Ct. Cl. 360 (1960). However, courts have used the "continuing
claims" theory to decide that a new claim accrues each time the government restores a
property owner's expectation that he will be able to use or develop his property. Townsend
v. State of New Mexico State Highway Department, 871 P.2d 958 (N.M. 1994) (a new
cause of action arose each time the state highway department changed the character of the
rocks on the landowner's property by blasting, and each time the highway department truck
left the property loaded with sand and gravel).
57. 41 F.3d 627 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
58. Id. at 634. It is interesting to note that by initiating plans to restore the Applegate
beach, the Corps conceivably "restored expectations" that the plaintiffs would regain use
of their property.
59. White Pine Lumber Company v. City of Reno, 801 P.2d 1370 (Nev. 1990). The
Nevada Supreme Court held that the fifteen-year statute of limitations applicable to adverse
possession claims applied to the plaintiff's takings claim. The decision reversed a lower
court ruling that dismissed the plaintiffs claim, which was filed nine years after the
government act, and five years after the statute of limitations had run. Id.
60. See, e.g., Costello v. Unarco Industries, 490 N.E.2d 675 (Ill. 1984) (permitting
a claim in 1981 for exposure to asbestos which occurred in the 1940s, even though the
Illinois legislature had enacted an eight year time limit for product liability cases);
Kensinger v. Abbott Laboratories, 171 Cal. App. 3d 376 (1985) (allowing claim for second
generation "DES" plaintiff).
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Applegate appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that equitable tolling
applies to claims against the federal government6 and used the doctrine
to uphold a takings claim filed almost forty years after the government
seized the plaintiff's property.62
Recognizing that the principles of fairness underlying a statute of
limitations apply to defendants as well as plaintiffs, the courts have
developed a "middle ground" approach to balance the interests of both
parties.63 This approach requires that a plaintiff make a diligent attempt
to discover damage that a "reasonable and prudent" property owner
would have discovered under the same circumstances, and prevents a
claimant from waiting until "the last grain of sand" is gone before filing
a claim .' Courts have used this approach to dismiss claims where a
plaintiff did not use "due diligence" to discover the damage until after the
statute of limitations had run.6  The approach alerts the accused, yet
61. In Irwin v. Dep't of Veteran's Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990), the Supreme Court
held that, as a rebuttable presumption, the doctrine of equitable tolling is applicable to
claims brought against the United States.
62. In United States v. Hohri, 482 U.S. 64 (1987), the Supreme Court upheld a
decision allowing a 1983 claim filed by Japanese-Americans whose property had been
seized by the government during World War I. The lower court ruled that the government
had deceitfully withheld evidence that the claimants may have been able to use to prove that
no military emergency existed at the time the government seized their property. Without
a military emergency, the government would have been precluded from seizing the
plaintiffs' property without compensation. Similarly, although the Applegate court did not
mention the equitable tolling theory in its decision, the fact that the government developed
three separate proposals to replace the lost sands may have "deceived" the plaintiffs into
not filing a takings claim earlier.
63. In denying a takings claim filed more than six years after a government dam
reduced the water flow of a river the plaintiffs had used for irrigation, the U.S. Court of
Claims said, "[t]here must be a middle ground between the open-end application of the
Dickinson doctrine for which plaintiffs contend and premature foreclosure by resjudicata
to which the Dickinson opinion refers." Gustine Land & Cattle Co. v. United States, 174
Ct. Cl. 556, 657 (1966) (first emphasis added).
64. See, e.g., Hopland Band of Porno Indians v. United States, 855 F.2d 1573, 1577
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (a cause of action first accrues when "all the events which fix the
government's alleged liability have occurred and the plaintiff was or should have been
aware of their existence"); Fallini v. United States, 56 F.3d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
("a plaintiff does not have to possess actual knowledge of all relevant facts in order for the
cause of action to accrue").
65. In Alaska v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 689 (1995), the court that ruled the statute
of limitations barred the State's claim that the federal government restrictions on the export
of Alaskan crude oil was a compensable taking. The court decided that because the
regulation had been in effect for some years, Alaska should have discovered its adverse
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discourages a claimant from filing an untimely claim merely because she
has "nothing to lose and everything to gain."I
In Dickinson, the Supreme Court reasoned that "there is nothing in
legal doctrine, to preclude the law from. . . postponing suit until the
situation becomes stabilized ... [so] that a final account may be struck."67
Given the legislative and judicial exceptions to arbitrary and subjective
statute of limitations periods, it is fair and reasonable for the courts to
recognize that the term "accrues" may be a date other than the date of the
government act. In fact, for takings cases, the Supreme Court has
concluded the act accrues "when all events have occurred that fix the
alleged liability of the United States and entitle the claimant to institute an
action. "68 This determination is "somewhat imprecise" and poses question
of fact "in the nature of a jury verdict"69 that "depends on the facts of
each case."'I Thus, the stabilization doctrine developed in Dickinson is
merely a mechanism that the court applies to the facts of an individual
case to determine when the plaintiff should have reasonably known that
the situation had reached the point where she could, and should, file a
takings claim.
III. SUBJECT CASE: APPLEGATE V. UNITED STATES
In 1992, a class of 271 landowners including the Applegates, filed a
complaint in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims alleging a taking. 71 The
claim was based on erosion damage caused by an Army Corps of Engi-
neers project that was designed to create a deepwater harbor for Cape
Canaveral. This project involved building two jetties and dredging a
thirty-six foot deep, 400 foot wide, six mile long channel.' The channel
financial impacts several years before the State filed suit.
66. See Richard Parker, Is the Doctrine of Equitable Tolling Applicable to the
Limitations Periods in the Federal Tort Claims Act?, 135 Mm. L. REv. 1, 17 (1992), in
which the author argues that tort law suffers from time limit exceptions such as equitable
tolling because it allows plaintiffs to file untimely claims. Thus, for tort claims, there is
no "middle ground" balancing of interests.
67. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 749 (1947).
68. Japanese War Notes Claimants Ass'n v. United States, 373 F.2d 356, 358 (Ct.
Cl. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 971 (1967).
69. Barnes v. United States, 538 F.2d 865, 873 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
70. Id.
71. Applegate v. U.S., 25 F.3d at 1580.
72. Pitman v. United States, 457 F.2d at 976.
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cut through two shallow tidal lagoons and a barrier beach that had
provided a natural shelter against winds and storms. Following the initial
construction, the Corps returned on at least five occasions to further
dredge the channel or to extend the jetties.73
The Applegate plaintiffs claimed, and the government did not dispute,
that the project eroded up to 400 feet of beachfront property along a forty-
one mile beach and threatened to destroy homes.74 Although Congress
had authorized $5.0 million to construct a sand transfer plant as early as
1962, the Corps repeatedly initiated, and subsequently delayed, plans for
the plant. As late as 1988, only four years before the plaintiffs filed their
claim, the Corps issued its latest proposal to construct the transfer plant. 5
However, at the time of trial, the Corps had not acted.76
The Court of Federal Claims relied on Nadler to find that the
Applegate plaintiffs should have "foreseen" the erosion, and on Barnes
to conclude that they knew the erosion was "permanent" decades before
73. Every eighteen months since 1955, the Corps dredged the channel for
maintenance purposes. The Corps made several additional improvements that: deepened
and widened the port in 1956 and 1957; extended the north jetty in 1958; deepened the
channel in 1961 and 1975; and enlarged the port in 1986. Applegate v. United States, 28
Fed. Cl. at 556.
74. Id. at 557.
75. Applegate v. United States, 25 F.3d at 1580. The following timeline describes
activities after Congress authorized the sand transfer plant in 1962:
(1) In 1967, the Corps presented a $1.3 million plan to restore the beaches and
build a sand transfer plant;
(2) In 1968, the Senate Public Works Committee and the Florida Department
of Natural Resources approved the plan;
(3) In 1971, after letting out bids, the Corps indefinitely delayed the transfer
plant to conduct further research and development but proposed an interim beach
renourishment plan. (In 1972, the court dismissed the Pitman case);
(4) In 1975, in response to a Congressional inquiry, the Corps indicated that it
would use sand it removed during construction of a Trident submarine base to
restore the beach;
(5) In 1985, in response to a Congressional inquiry, the Corps repeated its
intention to use the sand from the submarine base to restore the beach despite
having already dumped some of the available sand miles offshore;
(6) In 1988, the Corps proposed a $5.0 million plan to construct a sand transfer
facility system.
Applegate v. United States, 25 F.3d at 1580; Applegate v. United States, 28 Fed. CI. 554,
557 (1993), rev'd and remanded, 25 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
76. Applegate v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. at 1580.
77. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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they filed their claim. 78 Therefore, the court held that the six-year statute
of limitations applicable to Tucker Act claims barred the plaintiffs' 1992
claim for erosion damage that was caused by a project constructed in the
1950s. However, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed
this decision. 9
The federal circuit distinguished Nadler on the grounds that it
involved a one-time act that destroyed property in a single cave-in, while
Applegate involved gradual and continuous flooding.' The federal circuit
found Barnes inapplicable because the only question in Barnes was when
intermittent flooding became permanent, whereas, in Applegate, the
permanency of the erosion depended on whether the government followed
through with its plans to renourish the beach.8 The court concluded that
the Applegate situation was similar to Dickinson, in that the matter
involved continual and gradual flooding, and Cooper, where the plaintiffs
needed to determine the extent of the damage with some "certainty"
before filing their claim.' Because the erosion had not stabilized, and
because the government had initiated its latest plan to construct a sand
transfer plant as late as 1988, the Applegates could not have been ex-
pected to calculate the damage with any "certainty" before 1988.
Therefore, the statute of limitations did not bar the Applegate's suit. On
78. Applegate v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. at 560-62.
79. Applegate v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 554 (1993), rev'd and remanded, 25
F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
80. Applegate v. United States, 25 F.3d at 1583. The court of appeals concluded:
Nadler did not feature the uncertainties present in this case [(Applegate)]....
[T]here were no promises to correct the situation.... [and] the Government
had in 1934 flatly rejected Nadler's demands for construction of protection
against subsidence. In sum, the Nadler taking situation had stabilized in 1934
[(when the government performed its one-time dredging operation and the first
major cave-in occurred)].
Id.
81. Referring to the question of permanency posed in Barnes, the Court of Appeals
stated that "[i]n this case, precisely because of the Government's promises to build a sand
transfer plant, the landowners remain justifiably uncertain about the permanency of the
erosion." Id.
82. In noting the similarities between Applegate, Dickinson, and Cooper, the Court
of Appeals indicated, "the almost imperceptible physical process has delayed detection of
the full extent of the destruction - a necessary precondition of striking a final account."
Id. at 1582.
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remand, the lower court had to proceed to the substantive issue of whether
a taking had occurred. 83
IV. DISCUSSION
Before considering how a strictly applied six-year time limit would
have interfered with the ability of the Applegates to prove their takings
claim, it is important to note that other provisions of the Tucker Act
preclude plaintiffs such as the Applegates from asking the court to: 1)
order the government to condemn their property before constructing the
port; 2) halt construction of the port, the further dredging of the channel,
or the extension of the jetties; 3) order the government to build the sand
transfer plant; or 4) award damages for temporarily taking their beach-
front property.' The only recourse for such plaintiffs is to wait until the
government permanently takes their property and then to file a claim for
damages. Thus, the timing of a takings claim is a major consideration for
Applegate-type plaintiffs.
In the instant case, if the Applegates filed prematurely, they might not
have been able to determine the full extent of the damage. Alternatively,
the court might have ruled that the damage was not sufficiently significant
or permanent as to amount to a taking. Moreover, the Corps could have
argued that the claim was not ripe, or that the damage was only temporary
because the government planned to restore the beach. However, if the
Applegates waited too long, as the government alleged, the Tucker Act's
six-year time limit would have barred their claim. These procedural and
substantive hurdles, which are faced by plaintiffs like the Applegates,
83. Id. at 1584. On remand, the case grew to more than 300 plaintiffs. Applegate
v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 406, 410 (1996). Together these plaintiffs claimed a total of
$100,000,000 in damages. Civil Docket for Case #: 92-CV-832, at 1, Applegate v. United
States, 35 Fed. Cl. 406 (1996) (No. 92-CV-932) (as of Sept. 18, 1995). After scores of
motions, answers and status reports spanning almost 18 months, the Court of Federal
Claims dismissed summary judgment requests by both parties. The court found that there
were genuine issues of material fact that must be heard before the court rules for or against
either party. However, the court did hold that the government must compensate the owners
for any flooding or erosion damage to the property-above the high water mark-that
occurred after the plaintiff purchased the land, provided that the plaintiffs are able to
demonstrate the amount of beachfront property lost to erosion and flooding. The court
scheduled a pretrial conference for mid-July to establish trial dates. Thus, more than two
years will have elapsed between the date of the remand and the date on which the actual
trial begins. Applegate v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. at 425 (1996).
84. See supra notes 12-14.
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provide a great incentive for the government not to compensate landown-
ers before taking their property. Given these barriers, it was appropri-
ate for the court to allow the Applegates to delay filing suit until they
could demonstrate that "but for" the government port project their
property would not have been damaged, and additionally, that "but for"
the Corps' repeated plans to restore the beach, the damage would have
been permanent. Because there were two acts that "caused" the taking-
one that created the damage and a second that made the damage perma-
nent-it was also reasonable for the court to consider both "acts" to
determine if the statute of limitations was met. Considering both acts, the
court reasoned that while the damage element of the claim depended on
the government construction of the port, the time limit element depended
on when the situation stabilized or when the damage became permanent.
Furthermore, because the erosion situation never stabilized, the statute of
limitations question hinged on when the erosion became permanent. The
court concluded that the erosion was not permanent until the Applegates
were reasonably certain that the government was not going to restore the
beach; and when this event occurred, the plaintiffs properly filed suit.
Because both the port project and the plans to restore the beach were
substantive and factual elements of the Applegates' claim, it was appropri-
ate for the court to consider them both to determine the applicability of the
statute of limitations. In extending, tolling or even invalidating statutes
of limitations, the relevant case law demonstrates the courts' resolve to
allow substantive claims to overcome technical, procedural defenses, such
as time limits. The Applegate court recognized the importance of not only
permitting plaintiffs to show a cause of action but also providing them
with an effective remedy.
V. CONCLUSION
For future erosion victims, Applegate signifies that courts are not
limited to using the date that the government act causes the damage to
determine the date when the statute of limitations accrues. Courts are free
to combine different events to answer the threshold questions of "cause,"
"permanency" and "accrual." In other words, courts may combine
several actions, or even inactions, to determine the substantive and the
procedural elements of a takings claim.
Critics may argue that not adhering to established time limits results
in increased litigation, calendar congestion, transaction costs and stale
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claims.' However, adhering to strict time limits may actually result in
even more legal actions, because plaintiffs will resort to the "premature
and piecemeal litigation" that the Dickinson court struggled to avoid. 6
Furthermore, the courts have established safeguards to avoid stale claims,
and for those cases that make it to trial, the plaintiff still bears the burden
of proving the cause and permanency elements of a takings claim.
The Applegate decision merely removes an arbitrary, and subjective
procedural hurdle that promotes short-sighted planning on the part of the
government. In fact, the Congressional authorization of funds to build a
sand transfer plant, and subsequent government plans to restore the lost
sands, were major factors in the court's decision to allow this case to go
forward. Absent the specific government plans to repair the damage, it
is not clear that the court would have concluded that the statute of
limitations did not bar the plaintiffs' suit. However, given the govern-
ment's action, it is evident that if the court had barred the Applegates'
claim, the government could effectively avoid liability for future takings;
by physically invading property without confiscation and then by promis-
ing for a six-year period, to repair any government-caused damage, after
which a plaintiff would be barred from filing suit. This would create
situations where claimants who do not get their "day in court" would
further clamor about the inequities of the judicial system. It would also
give their legislative representatives additional fodder for enacting generic
takings legislation which would, ironically, be similar to the one-size-fits-
all generic statute of limitations. By not permitting the government to
abuse what is, in most cases, a legitimate procedural time limit for filing
takings claims, the court has sent a message that the government must take
responsibility for its actions.
85. Parker, supra note 66.
86. Furthermore, the current practice of allowing claimants to return to court to seek
additional damages when subsequent government acts result in further damage, creates
subsequent trials that are both timely and costly to all parties and the court system. See
also Slattery Company v. United States, 231 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1956), which describes the
conditions in which a plaintiff may return to court to sue for additional damages, and how
this option is generally limited to "structural changes" to the government facility that
resulted in the taking.
